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Abstract
Conventional theories of competition classify contests as being either “productive,” when the
competitive efforts generate a surplus for society, or “unproductive,” when competition gen-
erates no social surplus and merely distributes already existing resources. These two discrete
categories of competition create a division of real-world situations into analytical categories
that fails to recognize the entire spectrum of competitive activities. Taking the existing models
of productive and unproductive competition as benchmark idealizations, this paper revisits the
relationship between the privately and socially optimal levels of competition in the full range
of intermediate cases, as well as in the extremum cases of destructive and super-productive
competition.
Keywords: contests, rent seeking, unproductive competition, productive competition, patent
races
JEL Codes: C72, D72
1 Introduction
Competition is a fundamental ingredient of efficient markets. Yet not every form of competition
is productive or socially desirable. In many situations, contestants will expend costly efforts to win
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a prize (or a larger share of it than their competitors), even when their increasing efforts produce
no additional value to society. In such situations, competition does not increase the total welfare
of society, but simply generates a redistribution of resources and a dissipation of effort. Tullock
(1967, 1980) introduced the concept of “unproductive competition” into the economic literature,
providing a valuable tool for analyzing this previously neglected category of competition.1 In the
dichotomous distinction between rent seeking and profit seeking, the incentives that the rent seek-
ers face are those of a prisoner’s dilemma (Buchanan, 1980), and, once competitive expenditures
are accounted for, rent-seeking becomes a negative-sum game (Tullock, 1980). Following Tul-
lock (1967, 1980), rent-seeking models have been used to explain competition in a wide variety
of contexts, including political lobbying, regulatory capture, monopolies, sibling rivalry, political
campaigns, all-pay auctions, trade protection, patent races, civil litigation, bureaucracy, corruption,
and warfare.2
In this paper, we rely upon the traditional rent-seeking framework to revisit the various forms
of competition and analyze the social and private incentives to compete, under a unified frame-
work. Prior rent-seeking literature has mainly dealt with purely redistributive contests, building
on the premise that the rent-seeking efforts do not yield any benefit to society at large. Such rent-
seeking contests are juxtaposed against productive contests in which social gains are generated as
a by-product of the parties’ pursuit of private gains, such as in scientific or technological research
(see, among others, the introduction to Barzel, 1997). In this respect, the Industrial Organization
literature on patent races has extensively discussed the conditions under which the social and pri-
vate values of an innovation may or may not coincide (see, among others, Denicolo, 1999, and the
references therein).3
Our analysis builds upon the notions of productive rivalry used by Demsetz (1976) and of
rent-creation formulated by Buchanan (1980) to show and emphasize how different activities may
exhibit various degrees of social productivity. Even when competition is intrinsically redistributive,
1Gordon Tullock (1967) laid the foundations for the study of “unproductive competition,” which Krueger (1974)
later termed “rent seeking.” Bhagwati (1982) generalized the contributions of Tullock and Krueger, formulating a gen-
eral theory of “directly-unproductive profit seeking”. The common characteristic of these situations (and innumerably
many others) is that the rents sought by the contestants are fixed—their competitive efforts do not enlarge the prize at
stake. This desire to bridge the boundaries of productive and unproductive competition serves as a main motivation
for this paper. On competition, socially productive rivalry and regulation, see also Demsetz (1973, 1976); Crain and
Ekelund (1976).
2For recent overviews of the rent-seeking literature, see Congleton et al. (2008a,b); Konrad (2009) and Congleton
and Hillman (2015).
3Patent races are indeed traditionally regarded as inefficient, mainly because the winner-take-all nature of the com-
petition leads to excessive and wasteful research expenditures (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1971; Hartwick, 1991). Many con-
tributions have sought policy solutions to mitigate this problem (e.g., Ménière and Parlane, 2008; Gilbert and Katz,
2011).
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there are unintended social benefit of the rent-seeking contest, which may bridge the gap between
productive and unproductive competition.4 Following Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2007), we consider
a simple taxonomy of rent-seeking activities assuming that individuals carry out activities in the
pursuit of a private gain, and that their activities may be more or less valuable to society as a
whole. We identify a measure of social productivity of competition to distinguish five categories of
competition: (i) destructive, (ii) unproductive, (iii) semi-productive, (iv) productive, and (v) super-
productive competition. Recall that in the benchmark case of purely redistributive rent-seeking
games, no socially beneficial by-product is generated by the parties’efforts. Conversely, in purely
productive rent-seeking games, parties’ efforts lead to the creation or discovery of new resources,
the social value of which is equal to the parties’ private evaluation of the rent (Dari-Mattiacci
et al., 2007). Competitors invest costly effort to maximize their private return V , which may be
derived from productive surplus and/or redistributive rents. V is assumed to be equal for all the
parties and it is always positive. Rent-seeking activities, however, may generate positive or negative
externalities on third parties. Apart from the productive surplus of the competitors, the social value
of the competitive activity, T , might include the external benefits and costs of their activities on
third parties, such as the consumer surplus for a newly created market or invention, or the cost
imposed by illegal activities on individuals that are not rent-seekers in the contest.5 For example,
consider a patent race: V represents the patentee’s discounted profits during the lifetime of the
patent, and T the further increase (if any) in social welfare that the innovation brings about during
the lifetime of the patent (this increase in social welfare is not captured by the patentee; it may be
enjoyed by consumers or by other firms).6 In other words, in a patent race, T might include the
social benefit from the innovation which is not captured by the patentee and is therefore a positive
externality of the R&D activity.7 Let w = TV be the “social productivity” of the activity. Negative
values of w represent situations where the negative external cost of the rent seeking outweighs the
possible positive factors (e.g., the case of illegal activities to import illegal drugs as in Paul and
Wilhite, 1994). Positive values of w denote situations where the contest generates a net positive
social benefit (as, for example, the consumer surplus from the creation of a new market or a new
4Throughout the paper, depending upon the category of competition under consideration, we use the term activity in
its lay meaning, encompassing both productive and unproductive undertakings. Bhagwati (1982) focused exclusively
on directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities.
5It is worth noting that T and V are stationary flows: there is no dynamics in the contest apart from that generated
by the innovation (Denicolo, 1999).
6In Denicolo (1999), T is assumed to be strictly positive, although the author acknowledged the possibility of
non-pathological examples with a null or negative T . Our general taxonomy includes also these latter cases.
7In the simplest case with no externalities, T is the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus. When external-
ities arise, T reflects also the positive or negative effects generated on society. See, among others, Congleton (1989),
Paul and Wilhite (1994), Chung (1996) and Lee and Kang (1998) for examples of rent seeking with externalities.
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invention). We now classify the efficiency of competition in terms of w:
Destructive Competition (w < 0). This category encompasses situations where parties compete
to appropriate a benefit V > 0. In this set of situations, the creation of a private benefit leads
to a net social loss for society, T < 0. Activities that fall in this category include criminal
activities,8 political lobbying for inefficient special interest legislation, the creation of barriers
to entry, and unfair competition in general. The inefficiency of this form of rent seeking is
intrinsic in the parties’ objectives.
Unproductive Competition (w= 0). This is the special case considered by Tullock (1967, 1980),
and our “benchmark” for undesirable competition. This category encompasses purely dis-
tributive activities that produce a private gain for the contestants, V > 0, but which fail to
generate a corresponding benefit to society, T = 0. Examples include political lobbying for a
redistribution of rights or obligations, land disputes, civil litigation (ignoring the effects of de-
terrence or fairness), and other contests for the appropriation of a fixed resource (Buchanan,
1983; Gupta and Swenson, 2003). The special case in which T = 0 may arise, for instance,
with perfect competition in the product market when the innovation is not drastic and there
is perfect patent protection. In this case, the patentee reaps the entire social benefit from the
innovation during the lifetime of the patent (Denicolo, 1999).
Semi-Productive Competition (0 < w < 1). This category encompasses contests that, although
not directly productive, generate some positive byproduct for society. Semi-productive com-
petition arises when the social value of an activity is nonzero, but lower than the private value
for the contestants, 0 < T <V . Examples include political campaigning and commercial ad-
vertising (Cowling and Mueller, 1978, Littlechild, 1981, Congleton, 1986).9 The benefit to
society is positive but lower than what is at stake for the parties.
Productive Competition (w = 1). This category is our “benchmark” for desirable competition.
It is characterized by the condition that the private and social benefits from competition are
equal, V = T > 0. Productive activities, including the discovery and exploitation of natural
8Paul and Wilhite (1994) examined the “negative externality that results from market participants use of coercion
and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good.”. They show that the social cost of rent seeking exceeds
the value of resources dissipated in rent-seeking contest.
9Advertising is a dimension of non-pricing competition through which rent seeking may occur. There is a long
standing debate whether advertising is informative to consumers or wasteful, in order to measure correctly the social
loss produced by rent seeking (Cowling and Mueller, 1978, Littlechild, 1981). See also Dixit and Norman (1978) and
related work to this debate. For the purpose of our analysis, the inclusion of this example under this category is merely
illustrative and has no bearing on this debate.
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resources and research for the development of new goods and services can generate compe-
tition that falls in this category. In the context of patent races, the private and social values of
the patent are equal in cases where, for instance, the winner of the R&D race can perfectly
price discriminate (Lin, 1997).10
Super-Productive Competition (w > 1). The social benefit exceeds the private benefit sought by
the parties, T > V > 0. We may observe this condition in cases where producers pursue
a profit that does not capture the entire consumer surplus. This may indeed be the most
frequently observed care, inasmuch as all competitive and imperfectly competitive markets
leave a positive surplus to consumers. In all these cases, the producers’ profit, V , is lower
than the total surplus for society, T .
Previous rent-seeking literature identifies various measures of “rent dissipation” by looking at the
relationship between rent-seeking expenditures and the value of the sought-after rent. In this paper,
we revisit the relationship between the private value of the prize, V , and the social value of the con-
test, T , measured as the social value of the activity at the net of the positive or negative externalities
produced by the contest. Through this framework, we will show that private incentives to compete
are rarely aligned with the social objective and the amount of contestants’ expenditures may exceed
or fall short of the socially desirable values in the full range of competitive contests.11 The analysis
on how the private incentives to compete differ from the social optimum is highly relevant for pol-
icy analysis. Our results show that competition is increasingly desirable when the degree of the net
social productivity of the contest increases, and that a greater use of competition-boosting policies
is warranted in industries with large positive spillover effects between competitors. Interestingly,
we found that when competition can be sustained in concentrated markets, the discrepancy between
privately and socially optimal levels of competition is actually narrowed.
These results may be understood intuitively by considering the multiple effects of investments
in effort. Consider a patent race: when a firm invests in research, it increases the probability of
discovering a new technology. Obviously, society also shares in the enjoyment of this benefit.
However, investments in effort also improve the probability that one firm will discover, and re-
duces the probability of success for competing firms. These latter effects are redistributive and
10Lin (1997) argued that if the winner of the patent can capture all the social value of the innovation, the R&D race
in general leads to socially wasteful R&D effort due to its winner-take-all feature. In this case, licensing appears to
be socially desirable if it can eliminate excessive R&D. If instead the social value of the patent is not equal to V , it
is not clear how licensing affects welfare: a slower innovation process is not necessarily welfare improving. In this
case, the welfare effect of licensing will ultimately depend on the difference between the social and private value of the
discovery.
11Patent-race scholars have occasionally made the point that even when competition is intrinsically good, competi-
tion may be excessive. See for example Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
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accrue solely to the competing firms, with no corresponding value to society. Through this lens,
we can see that competitive contests are characterized by the presence of reciprocal externalities,
which may result in excessive competition: additional investments in research by one firm con-
tribute to the probability of a socially valuable discovery, but creates a relative disadvantage for
other firms to obtain the discovery. While discovery contributes to social welfare, the allocation
of intellectual property rights among competitors has distributive effects, which affect the overall
level of dissipation through competition.
2 The Model
We consider a contest where two players compete to win a prize with value V > 0. We assume
that society has a valuation T for the prize which may differ from V . The contestants simultaneously
and independently choose their level of effort ei ≥ 0, i = 1,2, to win the prize.12 The probability





i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (2.1)
where z > 0 is a constant positive likelihood that nobody will win the contest and h(ei), i = 1,2,
is a twice differentiable, increasing and concave function, h
′
(ei) > 0, h
′′
(ei) < 0, with h(0) = 0.
The constant z can be interpreted for example as the overall difficulty of the research in a patent
race contest. The assumptions on h(ei), i = 1,2, ensure that each player’s chance of winning the
contest increases with his expenditure at a decreasing rate, and decreases with the other contestant’s
expenditures at an increasing rate. The expected payoff of player i = 1,2 is the expected private
12The analysis presented here can be extended to consider an endogenous prize increasing in the level of parties’
efforts. The qualitative nature of our conclusions does not change. Proof available upon request.
13The specific functional form adopted here follows Blavatskyy (2010) who models the contestant’s probability to
win the prize allowing for the possibility of a draw, i.e., the contest outcome without either side winning. In this case,
the sum of winning probabilities does not add up to one. Contests can be generally classified as either perfectly or
imperfectly discriminating. Among others, see Hillman and Riley (1989) for a comparison of these two categories of
contests. Most contributions on imperfectly discriminating contests adopted the logit-form contest success function
(e.g., Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995; Nti, 1997, 1999), whereas a few papers adopted the probit form (e.g., Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987).
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value of the contest, at the net of expenditures:14
Ri = pi(ei,e j)V − ei = h(ei)Vz+h(ei)+h(e j) − ei i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (2.2)
The expected social value of the contest is given by the probability that one of the two firms wins,15
at the net of both players’ expenditures:
(p1(e1,e2)+ p2(e1,e2))T − e1− e2 = (h(e1)+h(e2)) Tz+h(e1)+h(e2) − e1− e2 (2.3)
Society benefits are obtained if at least one of the two firms make the discovery, regardless of which
of the two firms is the first to discover. However, from the contestant’s perspective, a private benefit
accrues only if he is the first to discover. This creates a discrepancy between the private incentives
to compete and the social objective. In the following we study the conditions under which private
and social optima diverge on the basis of w= TV , interpreted as the social productivity of the activity.
Proposition 2.1 (Private Incentives to Compete). Private incentives to compete exceed (equal) the
socially optimal levels for all values of w < 1+ h(e∗)/z (w = 1+ h(e∗)/z). Private incentives to
compete fall below the socially optimal levels when w > 1+h(e∗)/z.
Corollary 2.2 (Social Productivity and Optimal Competition). In the benchmark case considered in
Proposition 2.1, competitive efforts are excessively high in all cases of destructive, unproductive,
semi-productive and productive competition and can also be excessive for some cases of super-
productive competition.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 compare the privately and socially optimal levels of effort and
identify the conditions under which contestants compete more (or less) than would be desirable
from a social welfare perspective. Proposition 2.1 tells us when private incentives to compete
may exceed or fall short of the socially optimal level. It is interesting to observe here that in the
conventional dichotomy (Buchanan, 1980), all rent seeking is by definition “excessive” inasmuch
as it is unproductive. However, once the unintended external effects of the contest are taken into
account, a more nuanced evaluation becomes necessary. Privately optimal levels of competition
14As in Blavatskyy (2010), we implicitly assume throughout the analysis that the losing prize is zero. For an analysis
of contests with a positive losing prize, see Baye et al. (2012).
15The probability that “one of the two firms discovers” is the sum of the probabilities of “firm 1 discovers first” and
“firm 2 discovers first” by mutual exclusivity.
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may fall short or exceed the socially optimal levels. Interestingly, our analysis reveals that the
conditions for suboptimal and excessive competition do not correspond to the threshold values of w
used in our taxonomy in Section 2. This can be explained by considering that the private benefit of a
marginal increase in effort is greater than the social benefit, whereas the private and social marginal
costs are both equal to 1. Firms will thus over-invest in effort when w ≤ 1. This implies that
competitive contests lead to excessive competition in all cases of destructive, unproductive, semi-
productive and productive competition. Excessive levels of competition can also be observed in the
initial range of super-productive competition, when 1 < w < w. Suboptimal levels of competition
may, instead, be observed in the upper range of super-productive competition, when w > w. In this
case, the social value of production T is sufficiently larger than the private value of production V ,
and the parties’ private incentives do not account for the full social value of the discovery.
Analytically, the threshold w equals 1+ h(e∗)/z. To understand this threshold, consider that
in the absence of competition (n = 1), the firm appropriates the full value of its research. Private
and social optima will thus converge when T =V (i.e., w = 1). Excessive (suboptimal) efforts will
be observed when T < V (T > V ). However, imperfect appropriation of the prize occurs when
two or more contestants compete for the prize. The threshold w therefore increases above 1, by
the ratio h(e∗)/z which measures the relative difficulty of the contest, i.e., the probability that the
opponent wins the prize relative to the overall probability that neither contestant wins the prize.
When contestants do not fully appropriate the value of their research, a convergence of private and
social optima occurs at a threshold w > 1 (i.e., when T >V ).
The analysis above provides a lens through which we can analyze how the private incentives
to compete differ from the social optimum. A rigorous understanding of the social desirability of
competition is highly relevant for policy analysis, inasmuch as it allows us to identify the range
of cases where competition levels fall short or exceed the socially optimal levels. Competition-
boosting policies are warranted when private incentives to compete fall short of the social optimum,
while constraints on competition become desirable to tame excessive levels of competition.
3 Some Extensions
In Section 2 we showed that for a broad range of contexts, competition that is intrinsically
productive can nevertheless lead to excessive dissipation and become socially undesirable. In the
following, we shall recast these results by considering some extensions that may illuminate the
problem of dissipation in real life competitive situations.
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3.1 Contests with Positive Spillover Effects
We consider the case where each party’s competitive efforts produce positive effects on the
other contestants’ probability of winning the prize. Positive spillover effects are often found in
research races, where the discoveries of a firm benefit the parallel research efforts of competitors
and create spillover effects throughout the industry (e.g., Hartwick, 1991; Fung, 2002; Baye et al.,
2012; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a,b, 2015).16 We consider that each agent has a linear
production function for effective investment, and the marginal rate of technical substitution among
the private effort and the spillover effect does not vary across the contestants. The probability that
player i wins the contest takes the following logit-form contest success function:17
pi,s =
ei,s+θe j,s
z+ ei,s+ e j,s+θ(ei,s+ e j,s)
i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (3.1)
with θ ∈ (0,1], and where θ e j, j ∈ {1,2}, i 6= j represents the positive spillover of the effort of
player j on the probability of success of player i. Player i’s probability of winning the contest is
increasing in his expenditure at a decreasing rate, and decreases with the other contestant’s expen-
ditures at an increasing rate if ei,s(1− θ 2)− θz > 0, ∀i ∈ {1,2}. The expected payoff of player
i, Ri,s, and the expected social value with positive spillover effects are given by (2.2) and (2.3)
substituting (3.1).
Proposition 3.1 (Private Incentives to Compete with Positive Spillover Effects). Spillover effects
mitigate the problem of excessive competition. Private incentives to compete exceed (equal) the
socially optimal levels for all values of w< ws (w= ws), where ws = 1+
e∗s (1−θ2)−θz
z(1+θ) . With positive
spillovers, the threshold value is always ws < w. This implies that the range of cases characterized
by excessive competition is narrowed when positive spillover effects are present.
Corollary 3.2 (Social Productivity and Optimal Competition with Positive Spillover Effects). In
the presence of positive spillover effects, the threshold ws shifts to the left and suboptimal levels of
competition may be observed in the range of productive or semi-productive competition.
Proof. See Appendix.
16In the R&D literature, the term “spillover effect” is generally used when knowledge of the R&D results leaks
to other firms (Arrow, 1962). Baye and Hoppe (2003) argued that innovation tournaments exhibit not only negative
externalities due to the well-known negative business-stealing effect, but also positive externalities among players’
R&D efforts due to a “leap-frogging effect” on the value of the prize. Baye et al. (2012) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta
(2011a,b, 2015) examined contests in which winner and loser prizes may be asymmetrically influenced by rival effort.
See also Dechenaux and Mancini (2008) analyzing a generalized contest payoff function in all-pay auctions.
17The specific anonymous logit CSF here adopted follows Münster (2009) and Rai and Sarin (2009), where the
success functions are designed to capture positive spillover effects and multidimensional efforts.
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Modern legal systems and norms in the scientific community tend to allocate rights and aca-
demic recognitions on a first-in-time basis when activities are super-productive. Consider for ex-
ample the competitive allocation of rights for patentable innovations and scientific discoveries. The
super-productive nature of those activities is due to the fact that the private value of a patentable
innovation is linked to the expected value of the producer’s profit during the protected period, and
fails to capture the consumer surplus produced after the expiration of the patent. Similarly, scientific
research yields knowledge and informational benefits to society at large, that are not appropriated
by the discoverer. In both cases, the competitors’ stakes are smaller than the full social value of their
efforts, hence falling within the category of super-productive competition in our taxonomy. Propo-
sition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 interestingly show that for those situations, the competitive incentives
created by competitive allocation rules may thus be closely aligned with the social objective.
On a more general note, the presence of positive spillovers mitigates the problem of excessive
competition identified in Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.2, limiting it to cases of productive and
semi-productive competition. Dissipation will therefore be less severe in industries characterized
by positive spillover effects. However, positive spillovers increase the number of situations with
insufficient levels of competition. We may observe suboptimal levels of competition not only for
super-productive competition, but also for productive and semi-productive competition, with the
critical threshold ws taking any value above zero. Competition-boosting policies may thus be (rel-
atively more) warranted in industries with larger positive spillover effects.
3.2 Contests with Positive Spillover Effects and Multiple Contestants
A natural extension of the foregoing model involves competitive contests among multiple firms.
When multiple firms participate in a competitive contest, unavoidably each individual firm has a
smaller chance of winning. This dilutes the expected return from each contestant’s investment. We
exemplify the analysis considering the case of three firms. In order to establish the socially optimal
level of competition, we follow Nti (1997), Münster (2009), Rai and Sarin (2009), and we define
the probability that player i ∈ {1,2,3} wins the contest as follows:
pi,sm =
ei,sm+θ(e j,sm+ ek,sm)
z+(1+2θ)(ei,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)
i, j,k = 1,2,3; i 6= j 6= k (3.2)
As in the case with two contestants, each player’s chance of winning increases with his expenditure
at a decreasing rate. The expected payoff of player i, Ri,sm, and the expected social value, with
i ∈ {1,2,3}, are given by (2.2) and (2.3) substituting (3.2).
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Proposition 3.3 (Social Productivity and Optimal Competition with 3 Contestants). In the absence
of spillovers, an increase in the number of competing firms reduces the efforts of each individual
firm, e∗m < e∗, while increasing the aggregate efforts of all contestants, 3e∗m > 2e∗. An increase
in the number of contestants widens the range of cases characterized by excessive competition.




z . The threshold increases by increasing the number of contestants, i.e., wm > w.
Corollary 3.4 (Social Productivity and Optimal Competition with Positive Spillover and 3 Contes-
tants). In the presence of spillovers, an increase in the number of firms has an indeterminate effect
on the threshold wsm, where wsm = 1+
2(e∗sm(1−θ)(1+2θ)−θz)
z(1+2θ) . The threshold wsm increases when the
competition effect dominates the spillover effect, i.e., wsm > ws.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.3 reveals that the presence of multiple competitors (i) reduces individual efforts,
(ii) increases aggregate efforts, and (iii) increases the threshold of socially optimal competition.
The first two results are consistent with the standard results in the rent-seeking literature (Tullock,
1980, Nti, 1997). The third result is novel: not only do aggregate efforts increase, but the range of
cases where socially undesirable dissipation materializes also expands to include what may have
been efficient (or closer to efficient) competition with fewer competitors. It is interesting to observe
the apparent tension between the first and the third points. Despite the fact that contestants expend
less effort when n grows larger, the misalignment between private and social optima increases and
each contestant’s effort departs further from the socially optimal levels. Given that the range of
situations characterized by excessive competition increases in n, the problem of excessive dissi-
pation through competition in fragmented markets may be more severe and may be observed in
a wider range of values of social productivity. This result seems to run against the conventional
wisdom in competition policy. Market concentration — problematic as it may be for sustaining ac-
tual competition — may actually mitigate the problem of excessive dissipation. When competition
can be sustained in concentrated markets, the gap between privately and socially optimal levels of
competition will actually be narrower.
4 Concluding Remarks
The received view in competition scholarship is that the desirability of competition hinges upon
the social productivity of the underlying activity: productive competition is desirable and should
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be encouraged, and unproductive competition is undesirable and should be discouraged. By fo-
cusing most of the attention on these idealized cases, competition scholars have little explored the
gradations of social productivity that characterize most real-world competitive contests. In this pa-
per, we provide a unified analytical framework bridging the gap between the models of productive
and unproductive contests. By reformulating the standard rent-seeking model to represent both
unproductive and productive competition, we identified several additional categories: destructive,
semi-productive and super-productive competition. In this setting, we show that the alignment of
privately and socially optimal levels of competition hinges upon a variety of factors and formulated
several refinements to the conventional wisdom on the social desirability of competition.
There are important lessons that emerge from our taxonomy. Our analysis reveals that in-
centive misalignment can lead to excessive dissipation through competition in most competitive
situations, spanning across all cases of destructive, unproductive, quasi-productive, productive, and
even super-productive competition. Competition is increasingly desirable when the degree of the
net social productivity of the contest increases. Competition levels are suboptimal when the so-
cial value of the contest is sufficiently larger than the private value. Furthermore, competition
levels fall short of the socially optimal level in a wider range of cases when positive spillover ef-
fects are present: due to spillover effects, suboptimal levels of competition can be observed not
only for super-productive competition, but also for productive and semi-productive competition. A
greater use of competition-boosting policies may thus be warranted in industries with larger pos-
itive spillover effects. When multiple contestants are involved, the misalignment between private
and social optima increases. Despite the fact that contestants expend less effort when the number
of contestant grows larger, the level of competition may exceed the social optimum. Finally, our
results show that in concentrated markets, when collusion can be avoided, the cases of suboptimal
competition are actually fewer than previously believed. Future research could fruitfully exploit
our analytical framework to study different categories of competition and alternative intellectual
property and reward systems in competitive contests.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 and of Corollary 2.2. The privately optimal investments in effort e∗i , i ∈







)2 = 1 i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (A.1)













for i, j = 1,2; i 6= j, are satisfied since h′(ei) > 0 and h′′(ei) < 0, ∀i. In equilibrium, e∗1 = e∗2 = e∗,




The second order sufficiency condition for e∗ to be an interior Nash equilibrium is clearly satisfied.




)2 = 1 i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (A.4)
The second order sufficiency conditions for e∗∗i to be an interior Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
zh′′(e∗∗i )T(
z+h(e∗∗i )+h(e j)
)2 − 2z (h′(e∗∗i ))2 T(z+h(e∗∗i )+h(e j))3 (A.5)
for i, j = 1,2; i 6= j, are satisfied since h′(ei)> 0 and h′′(ei)< 0, ∀i. In equilibrium, e∗∗1 = e∗∗2 = e∗∗,




The second order sufficiency condition for e∗∗ to be an interior Nash equilibrium is clearly satisfied.














The LHS in (A.7) is larger than 1 if and only if e∗ ≥ e∗∗. Conversely, the RHS in (A.7) is always
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Thus, w≤ w is a necessary and sufficient condition for e∗ ≥ e∗∗ when V < T .
Proof of Proposition 3.1 and of Corollary 3.2. Player i’s probability of winning the contest is in-




z+ e j,s(1−θ 2)






z+ ei,s+ e j,s+θ(ei,s+ e j,s))3
< 0 (A.10)
The marginal impact of an increase of one player’s effort on the other player’s probability of win-











(z+ ei,s+ e j,s+θ(ei,s+ e j,s))3
(A.12)
Player i’s probability of winning the contest is decreasing (increasing) in the other player’s ex-
penditure at an increasing (a decreasing) rate when ei,s(1− θ 2)− θz > 0 (ei,s(1− θ 2)− θz < 0);
player i’s probability of winning the contest does not change with increases in the other player’s
expenditure when ei,s(1−θ 2)−θz = 0.





)2 = 1 i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (A.13)
with θ ∈ (0,1]. The second order sufficiency conditions for e∗i,s to be an interior Nash equilibrium,
i.e.,










2 = 1 (A.15)
The second order sufficiency condition for e∗s to be an interior Nash equilibrium is clearly satisfied.
By deriving e∗s from (A.15) and e∗ from the linear specification of (A.3), it follows that e∗s < e∗ for
θ ∈ (0,1]. The socially optimal investments in effort e∗∗i,s , i ∈ {1,2}, are computed as the solutions
of the following FOCs:
z(1+θ)T(
z+(e∗∗i,s + e j,s)(1+θ))
)2 = 1 i, j = 1,2; i 6= j (A.16)
The second order sufficiency conditions for e∗∗i,s to be an interior Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
− 2z(1+θ)
2 T(
z+(e∗∗i,s + e j,s)(1+θ))
)3 (A.17)
are always satisfied for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j. In equilibrium, e∗∗1,s = e∗∗2,s = e∗∗s , where e∗∗s is given by:
z(1+θ)T
(z+2e∗∗s (1+θ))
2 = 1 (A.18)
The second order sufficiency condition for e∗s to be an interior Nash equilibrium is clearly satisfied.













The LHS in (A.19) is larger than 1 if and only if e∗s ≥ e∗∗s . Conversely, the RHS in (A.19) is larger





Thus, w ≤ ws is a necessary and sufficient condition for e∗s ≥ e∗∗s . Since e∗s < e∗, when e∗s (1−
θ 2)− θz > 0, w > ws > 1. When e∗s (1− θ 2)− θz = 0, w > ws = 1; when e∗s (1− θ 2)− θz < 0,
0 < ws < 1 < w.
Proof of Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.4. Player i’s probability of winning the contest is in-
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(z+(ei,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1+2θ))3
< 0 (A.22)
with θ ∈ (0,1]. The marginal impact of an increase of one player’s effort on the other players










(z+(ei,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1+2θ))3
(A.24)
with i, j,k= 1,2,3, i 6= j 6= k. Player i’s probability of winning the contest is decreasing (increasing)
in the other player’s expenditures at an increasing (decreasing) rate when ei,sm(1− θ)(1+ 2θ)−
θz > 0 (ei,sm(1− θ)(1+ 2θ)− θz < 0). Player i’s probability of winning the contest does not
change with increases in the other player’s expenditures when ei,sm(1−θ)(1+2θ)−θz = 0.
The privately optimal investments in effort e∗i,sm, i ∈ {1,2,3} are given by:
(z+(e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1−θ)(1+2θ))V
(z+(e∗i,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1+2θ))2
= 1 i, j,k = 1,2,3; i 6= j 6= k (A.25)
The second order sufficiency conditions for e∗i,sm to be an interior Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
−(6z+2(e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1−θ)(1+2θ)
2)V
(z+(e∗i,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1+2θ))3
(A.26)





The second order sufficiency condition for e∗sm to be an interior Nash equilibrium is clearly satisfied.
By deriving e∗s from (A.15) and e∗sm from (A.27), it can be shown that e∗s > e∗sm, for all V,z> 0 such




By deriving e∗ from the linear specification of (A.3) and e∗m from (A.28), it follows that e∗m < e∗,
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and that 3e∗m > 2e∗, ∀V, z > 0. The socially optimal investments in effort e∗∗i,sm, i ∈ {1,2,3}, are
computed as the solutions of the following following FOCs:
z(1+2θ)T
(z+(e∗∗i,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1+2θ))2
= 1 i, j,k = 1,2,3; i 6= j 6= k (A.29)
The second order sufficiency conditions for e∗∗i,sm to be an interior Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
− 2z(1+2θ)
2T
(z+(e∗∗i,sm+ e j,sm+ ek,sm)(1+2θ))3
(A.30)












The second order sufficiency condition for e∗∗sm to be an interior Nash equilibrium is clearly satisfied.

















The LHS in (A.33) is larger than 1 if and only if e∗sm≥ e∗∗sm. Conversely, the RHS in (A.33) is always





Thus, w≤ wsm is a necessary and sufficient condition for e∗sm ≥ e∗∗sm. Given e∗s > e∗sm, by comparing

















The LHS in (A.35) is larger than (equal to) 1 if and only if e∗m > e∗∗m (e∗m = e∗∗m ). Conversely, the
RHS in (A.35) is always equal or larger than 1 when V ≥ T . When V < T , the RHS in (A.35) is
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Given e∗m < e∗ and 3e∗m > 2e∗, by comparing (A.8) and (A.36), it can be easily verified that w<wm.
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